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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine whether institutional shareholders prefer concentrated or 
dispersed executive compensation structure. To address this question, we study the 
relationship between executive compensation concentration and institutional 
ownership power because institutional investors can influence executive 
compensation more when they have more power. We measure institutional 
ownership power using institutional ownership level and institutional ownership 
concentration. We find a significant negative relationship between executive 
compensation concentration and institutional ownership power. 
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1.Introduction 
 
The percentage of stock held by institutional investors exhibits a significant increase 
in the U.S market since the 1950s. In 1950s and 1980s, institutional investors were 
estimated to hold 8% and 33% of total shares, respectively (Taylor, 1990), but this 
level has increased to an estimated 75% in 2012. This increase in institutional 
ownership signifies an increased active influence on firm management decision by 
institutional investors (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1998). Some prior studies, such as 
that of McConnell and Servaes (1990), indicate a positive relationship between firm 
value and ownership held by institutional investors. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
suggest that institutional investors can effectively monitor managers and therefore, 
there is a significant positive correlation between the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors and firm performance.  
 
There are also studies suggesting that executive compensation concentration 
significantly correlates with firm performance. Tournament theory asserts that it is 
beneficial to set compensation policy based on relative ranking within firm. High 
concentration compensation policy can be used as an incentive to encourage 
effectivity and efficiency amongst firm managers resulting in improved firm 
performance (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Conyon, Peck and Sandler (2001) also argue 
that compensation gap in different position levels promotes competition within a 
firm and managers have to improve their productivity for better firm achievement 
and thus be promoted to a high level position. Contrary to the tournament theory, 
equity fairness theory asserts that large compensation gap breeds disharmonious 
and non-cooperative working environment, negatively impacting firms’ 
performance (Wade, O’Reilly and Pollock, 2006).  
  
Multiple studies have analyzed the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance, and the relationship between executive compensation 
concentration and firm performance. However, few studies have investigated the 
relationship between institutional ownership structure and executive compensation 
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concentration. We assume that a high institutional ownership concentration within 
a firm or a high institutional ownership level indicate that the institution owners 
have the power to influence compensation structure in the firm. In order to 
maximize the firm’s profits, institutions would provide the executives with the 
optimal incentives to improve the firm’s performance.   In our paper, we will 
examine if institutional ownership power has a relation with executive 
compensation concentration and if yes, how. Our two hypotheses are that (1) 
according to the tournament theory, firms have a higher executive compensation 
concentration if institutions have more power; (2) according to the fairness theory, 
firms have a lower executive compensation concentration if institutions have more 
power; 
 
We measure the power of institutional investor in two aspects: institutional 
ownership level and concentration of institutional ownership. The first is the 
institutional ownership level, which is the total share percentage held by 
institutional investor within a firm. The second is institutional ownership 
concentration，which describes the concentrated extent of these shares. In doing so, 
we quantify executive compensation concentration using compensation HHI from 
2247 firms for 22 years from 1992 to 2014. Compensation HHI is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration generated from the total compensation of the top 
5 executives. We compute institutional ownership level as the sum of total 
percentage institutional holdings reported on 13F schedule. We determine 
Institutional ownership concentration using Institutional HHI, which is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration reported in Thomson-Reuters database.  
 
We begin with correlation analysis and find that there is a significantly negative 
relationship between executive compensation concentration and institutional 
ownership concentration and a significantly positive relationship between executive 
compensation concentration and institutional ownership level.  Then, we proceed 
the t-tests across ten different industries. The result demonstrates that six out of ten 
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industries show significant negative relation between institutional ownership 
concentration and executive compensation concentration, and nine out of ten 
industries show significant positive relation between institutional ownership level 
and executive compensation concentration. Finally, we do the regression analysis of 
executive compensation concentration regressed on institutional ownership 
concentration and institutional ownership level. Neither of the two variables are 
significant if we control for firm fixed effects. However, in the high institutional 
ownership concentration subsample, we discover that there is significantly negative 
relationship between institutional ownership level and executive compensation 
concentration. This regression result supports our second hypothesis that firms in 
which institutions have more power have a lower executive compensation 
concentration. 
2.Literature review and our hypotheses 
 
Prior studies suggest a significant relationship between executive compensation 
concentration and firm performance. Tournament theory argues that reward should 
be based on relative ranking of individuals instead of absolute output level. Lazer 
and Rosen (1981) argue that large pay gap can incentivize managers exert greater 
effort and thus improves the performance of a firm. In addition, these studies also 
suggest a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990) point out that a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm value as institutional investors can 
effectively monitor managers’ performance. They also propose a significant positive 
relation between the percentage of shares held by institutional investors and firm 
performance. Beatty and Zajac (1994) also argue that institutional investors want to 
provide large pay gap to firm manager as a strong incentive to increase firm value, 
which is consistent with the tournament theory. Therefore, institutions with high 
ownership and high concentration have more power to influence the management 
decision and they prefer to use high concentration compensation policy as an 
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incentive to improve firm performance. Based on the theory and reasoning, we 
develop our first hypotheses. 
 
H1: Firms have a higher executive compensation concentration if institutions 
have more power. 
 
Some prior studies also examine the relationship between firm performance and 
institutional ownership concentration. Alireza (2011) argues that institutional 
ownership concentration has a negative effect on firm performance. He explains that 
when an institutional investor owns the majority of a firm’s share, the managers 
would only try to satisfy the institutional block shareholder and this would harm the 
firm performance as a whole. Along with the positive relationship between 
executive compensation concentration and firm performance, there could be a 
negative relationship between executive compensation concentration and 
institutional ownership concentration. In addition, Wade, O’Reilly and Pollock (2006) 
suggest that a large pay gap has a negative effect on firm performance as it can lead 
to a disharmonious firm environment and sub-par employee productivity. Therefore, 
the block institutional investors would prefer not to use concentrated compensation 
policy.  Therefore, because institutions with high ownership level and high 
compensation concentration have more power to influence the management 
decision, they prefer to have low concentration compensation policy. 
 
 
H2: Firms have a lower executive compensation concentration if institutions 
have more power. 
3.Descriptive Statistics  
 
3.1 Data source 
Our executive compensation data is derived from Execucomp of WRDS, which 
covers 2247 firms from 1992 to 2014. We obtain data of ticker, sic, tdc1 and year. 
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We use ticker as identification number of a firm and we use tdc1 to calculate top 5 
executive compensation concentration. tdc1 is total direct compensation, which 
includes salary, bonus, restricted stock and long-term incentive. SIC is standard 
industrial classification code, which is the identification code of the industry type of 
a firm. We measure executive compensation concentration using compensation HHI, 
which is calculated from the top five executive total compensation. We use the 
following formula to calculate compensation HHI.  
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖 = ∑{
𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒′𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
} ² 
 
Next, We obtain institutional information from Thomson Reuters of WRDS. 
Institutional information includes instown_perc, instown_hhi shrout, prc. , SIC, year 
and ticker. Instown_perc is the sum of total percentage institutional holdings 
reported on 13F schedule. We measure institutional ownership level using 
instown_perc, which we directly get from WRDS. Instown_hhi is Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of concentration. We measure institutional ownership 
concentration using instown_hhi, which we can also directly get from WRDS. Shrout 
is the share outstanding each year. We calculate market value using prc times shrout 
and then divided it by 1000 to get the value in millions. Prc is the price per share 
each year. SIC is standard industry classification，which is used to distinguish each 
industry. We use ticker as identification number of a firm. Market value is our 
control variable. We obtained other control variable information from CRSP of 
WRDS such as ticker and ret.  ret is the holding period return and was used to 
calculate the annual return of a firm. 
 
After acquiring all the required data, we use ticker as firm identification number to 
consolidate the compensation, institutional, and control variable data. We then set 
standards to filter the data. For executive compensation, we eliminate firms whose 
total number of executives is less than five and we only keep the first five executive 
compensation in the rest firms. For institutional ownership, we drop firms whose 
market value was less than 50 million USD and institutional ownership percentage 
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higher than 1. For annual return, we exclude firms with less than 12 month of 
annual returns. After filtering the data, we construct our final data sample of 2247 
firms from 1992 to 2014. 
 
 3.2 Sample and variable 
The sample we obtained includes 2247 firm for 22 years during the period 1992 to 
2014. The total number of firm-year observations in our sample is 24257. We 
measure executive compensation concentration using compensation HHI. As we can 
see from Table 1; the mean and standard deviation of executive compensation 
concentration are 0.271 and 0.065 respectively. The mean and standard deviation of 
institutional ownership level are 0.670 and 0.197 respectively. We measure 
institutional ownership concentration using institutional HHI, which has a mean of 
0.058 and standard deviation of 0.058. In addition, we add two control variables - 
firm size and and firm annual return. It is widely recognized that firm size has a 
significant relationship with executive compensation. Tosi et al (2000) convey that 
more than 40% of the change of compensation can be explained by firm size. 
Previous studies also suggest that firm size is positively associated with 
concentration of pay within organization (Simon, 1957). 
 
Simon finds that large firms with many hierarchical levels prefer to maintain a 
significant pay gap between different levels. We measure it using natural logarithm 
of market cap. The second one is annual return of a company. Its mean is 0.190 and 
standard deviation is 0.643. 
 
4.Methodology 
 
4.1 Correlation analysis 
We conduct the correlation analysis among executive compensation concentration, 
institutional ownership level, institutional ownership concentration, size and annual 
return. As we can see from the Table 2,the relation between executive compensation 
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concentration and institutional ownership level, institutional ownership 
concentration and size is significant at 1% level. 
 
The relation between executive compensation concentration and annual return is 
significant at 10% level. The correlation coefficient between executive 
compensation concentration and institutional ownership level is positive, which is 
around 0.072. The correlation coefficient between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership concentration is negative, which is 
around -0.045. 
 
4.2 T-test analysis 
We conduct t-test among these variables based on 10 industries. We divide the 
sample into 10 industries using sic code, which we obtain from WRDS. The original 
sic code is a four-digit number. We divide the original sic code by 100 and then we 
get two-digit number, which represent 10 main industries. They are agriculture, 
mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, 
finance, service and public administration. We conduct the difference of mean t-test 
by dividing the compensation HHI into two groups. The first group is above the 
median of HHI. The second group is below the median of HHI. As we can see from 
Table 3, when we consider the entire sample  ,the means of executive compensation 
HHI across the two subsamples of institutional ownership level are significantly 
different, and this is similar in the case of institutional HHI.As for the control 
variable, when we consider the entire sample, the means of executive compensation 
HHI  across the two subsamples of size are significantly different, similar to the case 
for annual return. Size is higher for the high HHI and annual return is also higher for 
high HHI. When we consider size and annual return into these ten industries, we 
find that nine out of the ten industries remain significantly different between 
executive compensation concentration and institutional ownership level. However, 
only six out of ten industries show significance between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership concentration. The industries that show 
significance between executive compensation concentration and institutional 
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ownership level are agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale 
trade, retail trade, finance, service and public administration. And the industries 
that show significance between executive compensation concentration and 
institutional ownership concentration are manufacturing, transportation, wholesale 
trade, retail trade, finance and service. 
 
4.3 Regression analysis 
In order to explore the relationship better, we conduct three types of regression 
analysis, which includes two control variables. The first type is that we conduct the 
regression within the entire sample. The second type is that we divide the entire 
sample into two subsamples with high/low institutional ownership level and then 
conduct the regression on institutional ownership concentration. The third type is 
that we divide the entire sample into two subsamples with high/low institutional 
ownership concentration and then we conduct the regression on institutional 
ownership level.  The first control variable is size. The second control variable is 
annual return . We measure annual return by using every year’s holding period 
return in natural business year. 
Then we develop our regression model as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 
                 +𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 
                          +𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖                                
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
The dependent variable is executive compensation concentration. There are 4 
independent variables in our regression, and we include firm indicators for each of 
the firm, the 10 indicators for industry as well as year indicators for each of the 
sample years.  
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5.Empirical results and Discussion 
 
There are three plots in the Figure 1. The first plot describes normalized average 
executive compensation concentration from 1992 to 2014. We calculate normalized 
value using variable minus its mean and then divided by its standard deviation. The 
second plot describes normalized average institutional ownership level from 1992 
to 2014. The third plot describes normalized average institutional ownership 
concentration from 1992 to 2014. According to the first plot, we can see how 
executive compensation concentration change over year. We find that, in general, 
executive compensation concentration significantly increased from 1992 to 2014, 
which is peaked at 2000. This raises a question: What could influence the change of 
executive compensation concentration. In the second plot, we find that in general, 
institutional ownership level experienced an increase from 1992 to 2014. Therefore, 
we think there might be a positive relation between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership level. This would support our hypotheses 
1. Next, in the third plot, we find that in general, institutional ownership 
concentration experienced a decrease from 1992 to 2014. Therefore we think there 
might be a negative relationship between executive compensation concentration 
and institutional ownership concentration. This supports our hypotheses 2. 
 
In Figure 2, we provide a bar chart of executive compensation concentration, 
institutional ownership level and institutional ownership concentration based on 10 
industries. We arrange the bar from the biggest executive compensation 
concentration to smallest executive compensation concentration. As we can see the 
bar chart, Agriculture has the highest executive compensation concentration while 
Public administration has the lowest executive compensation concentration. When 
it comes to institutional ownership level, service has the highest institutional 
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ownership level while public administration has lowest institutional ownership 
level.  
 
We then plot similar bar charts for institutional ownership level and institutional 
ownership concentration. The bar chart across industries follows the same ordering 
as we have done for executive compensation concentration. This allows us to see 
whether the downward trend that we see in executive compensation concentration 
over these industry ordering has a corresponding relation with changes in 
intuitional ownership level and institutional ownership concentration. As for 
institutional ownership concentration, agriculture has the highest institutional 
ownership concentration while construction has the lowest institutional ownership 
concentration. As for the trend, institutional ownership level experienced a 
decreasing trend with the decreasing trend of executive compensation 
concentration. This supports our hypotheses 1 again. However, the trend of the 
Institutional ownership concentration is not clear in this bar chart.  
 
In the Table 4, we provide the regression results. There are five columns in the table. 
The first column only includes institutional ownership level, institutional ownership 
concentration, size and annual return as independent variables. The second column 
also includes the fixed year effect and fixed industry effect. The third column 
considers the fixed year effect and fixed firm effect. The fourth column includes the 
fixed year effect and fixed firm effect but excluded institutional ownership 
concentration as independent variable. The fifth column includes the fixed year 
effect and fixed firm effect but excluded institutional ownership level as 
independent variable. As we can see from this Table 4, in the first column, the 
coefficient between executive compensation concentration and institutional 
ownership level is significantly positive, which is around 0.018. It shows that a 
company with a high percentage of shares holding by institutional investor has a 
high pay gap. The coefficient between executive compensation concentration and 
Institutional ownership concentration is negative, which is -0.002. It shows that a 
company with a more concentration level on institutional ownership has a low pay 
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gap. However, this coefficient is not significant. In the second column, the coefficient 
between executive compensation concentration and institutional ownership level is 
also significantly positive, which is 0.017. The coefficient between executive 
compensation concentration and institutional ownership concentration is negative, 
which is -0.003. However, it still not significant. In the third column, we control for 
the firm fixed effects. The coefficient between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership level is positive, which is 0.003. The 
coefficient between executive compensation concentration and institutional 
ownership concentration is positive, which is 0.009. However, both coefficients are 
not significant. It is the same case for the fourth column and the fifth column. For all 
of the five columns, we do not find support for either of our two hypotheses. 
 
In the Table 5, we provide the results of regressions in Table 4 but on high/low 
institutional ownership level subsamples and high/low institutional HHI 
subsamples. We find in column (3) that in the subsample of high institutional HHI, 
there is a significant negative relation between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership level. It shows that because a high 
institutional ownership concentration and a high institutional ownership level 
suggest that institutions have the power to influence management’s decision, 
institutional owners prefer a low executive compensation concentration policy. It 
supports our second hypotheses that firms in which institutions have more power 
have a lower executive compensation concentration. 
6.Limitations 
 
Our study has some limitations. As for the regression model we conduct, there may 
be some weakness in our model. We could have misspecified the model. If the 
independent variable is correlated with error term, it shows that our model may 
omit some important variables. This may cause endogeneity problem, and as we 
have seen in model (1) and (2), the firm fixed-effect takes the explanatory power, 
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suggesting that there may be many other variables influencing compensation 
structure. 
 
 
7.Conslusion 
 
This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership power. According to our analysis, we find 
that there is a significantly negative relationship between executive compensation 
concentration and institutional ownership power. This proves our second 
hypothesis about the dominance of the equity fairness theory relative to the 
tournament theory. Besides, we always find there is a significant positive relation 
between executive compensation concentration and size of a firm, which is 
consistent with the argument of Tosi (2000). 
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8.Appendix 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the distribution of the main variables. The unit of observation is 
firm-year.  The sample includes 2247 firms during the period from 1992 to 2014. 
Compensation HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration generated 
from the total compensation of the top 5 executive compensations. Institutional 
ownership level is the sum of total percentage institutional holdings reported on 
13F schedule. Institutional HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration 
reported in Thomson-Reuters database. Market cap is the share price times shares 
outstanding in millions of $ US. Annual return is the annual return in a given 
calendar year (i.e., raw return from December to December of the following year). 
 
Variable n Mean Standard 
Deviation 
p5 p25 p50 p75 
Compensation 
HHI 
24257 .271 .065 .210 .231 .255 .289 
Institutional  
Ownership 
level 
 
24257 .670 .197 .300 .546 .698 .822 
Institutional 
HHI 
 
24257 .058 .058 .023 .034 .046 .063 
Market value 
 
24252 7.628 1.598 5.201 6.476 7.503 8.662 
Annual Return 24257 .190 .643 -.480 -.102 .121 .363 
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TABLE 2 Correlation matrix 
 
The table provides correlation matrix. Variables are defined in Table 1. *, ** or *** 
mean the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Compensation 
HHI 
Institutional 
Ownership Level 
Institutional 
HHI 
Size  
Annual Return 
 
Compensation 
HHI 
 
1.0000 
   
Institutional 
Ownership 
level 
 
0.0724*** 1.0000 
  
Institutional 
HHI 
 
-0.0457*** -0.2670 *** 1.0000 
 
Size 
 0.1016*** 0.1609 *** -0.3076*** 1.0000 
Annual Return 
0.0255* 0.0050*** -0.0306*** 0.0649*** 1.0000 
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TABLE 3 Difference of Means t-tests 
 
The following table presents the differences of means t-tests. Based on the median 
of each variable, we divided the sample into two groups and compare the means of 
executive compensation concentration between the groups. *, ** or *** indicate 
significant t-statistics at 10%, 5% or 1% levels, respectively. 
 n Low High t-statistic 
Variables     
Institutional Ownership level 24252 0.2671 0.2758 -10.38*** 
Institutional Ownership 
Concentration 
24252 0.2758 0.2671 10.53*** 
Size 24252 0.2653 0.2775 -14.67*** 
Annual Return 24257 0.2707 0.2722 -1.8141* 
Agriculture     
Institutional Ownership level 66 0.2637 0.2898 -1.7142* 
Institutional HHI 66 0.2843 0.2692 0.9766 
Mining     
Institutional Ownership level 1361 0.2673 0.2806 -3.9288*** 
Institutional HHI 1361 0.2743 0.3737 0.1669 
Construction     
Institutional Ownership level 3810 0.2655 0.2821 -8.7388*** 
Institutional HHI 3810 0.2776 0.2700 3.9879 
Manufacturing     
Institutional Ownership level 6696 0.2691 0.2780 -5.5792*** 
Institutional HHI 6696 0.2798 0.2672 7.9336*** 
Transportation     
Institutional Ownership level 2620 0.2655 0.2681 -1.1751 
Institutional HHI 2620 0.2687 0.2649 1.6821* 
Wholesales Trade     
Institutional Ownership level 2525 0.2673 0.2804 4.6726*** 
Institutional HHI 2525 0.2803 0.2675 4.5566*** 
Retail Trade     
Institutional Ownership level 3963 0.2604 0.2647 -2.2883** 
Institutional HHI 3963 0.3653 0.2598 2.9561*** 
Finance     
Institutional Ownership level 2437 0.2800 0.2734 2.0044** 
Institutional HHI 2437 0.2807 0.2727 2.3949** 
Service     
Institutional Ownership level 741 0.2663 0.2837 -3.6250*** 
Institutional HHI 741 0.2839 0.2661 3.7280*** 
Public Administration     
Institutional Ownership level 38 0.2685 0.2343 2.1515** 
Institutional HHI 38 0.2580 0.2448 0.7851 
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TABLE 4 Regression of compensation HHI on Institutional ownership level and 
Institutional HHI 
 
This table presents regression results where the dependent variable is 
compensation HHI. All variables are defined in Table 1.  *, ** or *** mean the 
coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
 
 Executive Compensation Concentration 
 1 2 3 4        5 
Institutional  0.0189*** 0.0175*** 0.0033 0.0026  
ownership level (5.17) (3.88) (0.58) (0.67)  
Institutional HHI -0.0022 -0.0037 0.0094  0.0078 
 (-0.17) -(0.31) (0.65)  (0.77) 
Size 0.0037*** 0.0041*** 0.0054*** 0.0052*** 0.0054*** 
 (7.65) (8.02) (4.91) (7.61) (7.90) 
Annual Return 0.0020** 0.0021* 0.0013 0.0013** 0.0013** 
 (1.9) (1.85) (1.35) (2.04) (2.05) 
Intercept 0.2305*** 0.2392*** 0.2096*** 0.2116*** 0.2104*** 
 (52.96) (23.22) (21.25) (13.25) (13.09) 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
No Yes No No No 
Firm Fixed Effects No No yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observation 
24525 24252 25242 25242 25242 
Adjusted-R 
Squared 
0.0137 0.0372 0.2507 0.2503 0.2507 
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TABLE 5 Regressions of compensation HHI on Institutional ownership level and 
Institutional HHI in subsamples 
 
The table shows regressions of Executive Compensation HHI on Institutional HHI 
in high/low (based on the median) institutional ownership level subsamples and 
regressions of compensation HHI on Institutional ownership level in high/low 
(based on the median) institutional HHI subsamples. *, ** or *** mean the 
coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% or 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
 
 Institutional ownership level Institutional HHI 
 High Low High Low 
Institutional    -0.018*** 0.0226*** 
ownership level   (-2.59) (3.88) 
Institutional HHI -0.0022 0.0060   
 (-1.11) (0.39)   
Size 0.0060*** 0.0050*** 0.0072*** 0.00551*** 
 (5.54) (4.09) (5.21) (5.36) 
Annual Return 0.0020* 0.001* 0.0001 0.0015* 
 (1.72) (0.70) (0.05) (1.80) 
Intercept 0.1810*** 0.234*** 0.2105*** 0.1984*** 
 (7.88) (9.22) (7.30) (11.44) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No No No 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
13424 13424 13424 13424 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2661 0.2701 0.3090 0.2581 
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FIGURE 1  
Trend of normalized average compensation HHI, normalized Institutional 
ownership level and normalized Institutional HHI overtime 
 
 
 
 
Executive compensation concentration 1992 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
Institutional ownership level 1992 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional ownership concentration 1992 to 2014 
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FIGURE 2 
 
The following graph represents 10 industries comparison of HHI compensation, 
Institutional HHI and Institutional ownership level. It is arranged from the biggest to 
smallest industry based on HHI Compensation. 
 
 
 
Industry Comparison 
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Industry Comparison 
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